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Research and practice suggest that cofounded ventures outperform solo-founded ventures. Yet, little work has explored the conditions under which solo founding might be preferable to cofounding. Combining an inductive case-oriented analysis with a Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 70 new entrepreneurial ventures, we examine why and how solo founders can be as successful as their peers in cofounded ventures. We find that successful solo founders strategically use a set of cocreators rather than cofounders to overcome liabilities, retain control, and mobilize resources in unique and unexpected ways. A primary contribution of this paper is an emergent configurational theory of entrepreneurial organizing. Overall, we reveal the broader significance and theoretical importance of adopting a configurational lens for both practitioners and scholars of entrepreneurship. Funding: Financial support from the Strategy Research Foundation [Grant SRF-2018-DP-9156] is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1548 .

Accelerators are entrepreneurial programs that attempt to help ventures learn, often utilizing extensive consultation with mentors, program directors, customers, guest speakers, alumni, and peers. Although accelerators have rapidly emerged as prominent players in the entrepreneurial ecosystem, entrepreneurs, policy makers, and academics continue to raise questions about their efficacy. Moreover, relevant organizational literature suggests that, even if accelerators are associated with better venture outcomes, results could be due to mechanisms other than learning, such as sorting or signaling. Drawing on mixed empirical methods that include proprietary data on the ventures accepted and "almost accepted" to a set of top accelerators, we find evidence that some, but not all, of the early accelerators we study substantially aid and accelerate venture development. We also find some evidence of sorting dynamics. These findings are corroborated using an auxiliary quantitative data set constructed from publicly observable data. Complementary qualitative fieldwork suggests a key driver of these accelerator effects is a novel learning mechanism we label broad, intensive, and paced consultation. The implication of these insights is that the practices of early accelerators represent a beneficial and likely replicable form of intervention that may also have relevance for independent entrepreneurs, educational programs, and corporate innovation.

Using a nested multiple-case study of participating ventures, directors, and mentors of eight of the original U.S. accelerators, we explore how accelerators' program designs influence new ventures' ability to access, interpret, and process the external information needed to survive and grow. Through our inductive process, we illuminate the bounded-rationality challenges that may plague all ventures and entrepreneurs—not just those in accelerators—and identify the particular organizational designs that accelerators use to help address these challenges, which left unabated can result in suboptimal performance or even venture failure. Our analysis revealed three key design choices made by accelerators—(1) whether to space out or concentrate consultations with mentors and customers, (2) whether to foster privacy or transparency between peer ventures participating in the same program, and (3) whether to tailor or standardize the program for each venture—and suggests a particular set of choices is associated with improved venture development. Collectively, our findings provide evidence that bounded rationality challenges new ventures differently than it does established firms. We find that entrepreneurs appear to systematically satisfice prematurely across many decisions and thus broadly benefit from increasing the amount of external information searched, often by reigniting search for problems that they already view as solved. Our study also contributes to research on organizational sponsors by revealing practices that help or hinder new venture development and to emerging research on the lean start-up methodology by suggesting that startups benefit from engaging in deep consultative learning prior to experimentation.

Our purpose is to clarify the microfoundations of performance in dynamic environments. A key premise is that the microfoundational link from organization, strategy, and dynamic capabilities to performance centers on how leaders manage the fundamental tension between efficiency and flexibility. We develop several insights. First, regarding structure, we highlight that organizations often drift toward efficiency, and so balancing efficiency and flexibility comes, counterintuitively, through unbalancing to favor flexibility. Second, we argue that environmental dynamism, rather than being simply stable or dynamic, is a multidimensional construct with dimensions that uniquely influence the importance and ease of balancing efficiency and flexibility. Third, we outline how executives balance efficiency and flexibility through cognitively sophisticated, single solutions rather than by simply holding contradictions. Overall, we go beyond the caricature of new organizational forms as obsessed with fluidity and the simplistic view of routines as the microfoundation of performance. Rather, we contribute a more accurate view of how leaders effectively balance between efficiency and flexibility by emphasizing heuristics-based "strategies of simple rules," multiple environmental realities, and higher-order "expert" cognition. Together, these insights seek to add needed precision to the microfoundations of performance in dynamic environments.

Using computational and mathematical modeling, this study explores the tension between too little and too much structure that is shaped by the core tradeoff between efficiency and flexibility in dynamic environments. Our aim is to develop a more precise theory of the fundamental relationships among structure, performance, and environment. We find that the structure-performance relationship is unexpectedly asymmetric, in that it is better to err on the side of too much structure, and that different environmental dynamism dimensions (i.e., velocity, complexity, ambiguity, and unpredictability) have unique effects on performance. Increasing unpredictability decreases optimal structure and narrows its range from a wide to a narrow set of effective strategies. We also find that a strategy of simple rules, which combines improvisation with low-to-moderately structured rules to execute a variety of opportunities, is viable in many environments but essential in some. This sharpens the boundary condition between the strategic logics of positioning and opportunity. And juxtaposing the structural challenges of adaptation for entrepreneurial vs. established organizations, we find that entrepreneurial organizations should quickly add structure in all environments, while established organizations are better off seeking predictable environments unless they can devote sufficient attention to managing a dissipative equilibrium of structure (i.e., edge of chaos) in unpredictable environments.